Assessing the economic impacts of alternative Information System (IS) designs and selecting IS design parameter values for a given decision setting are two important research issues in the domain of Information Systems. Evaluation studies based on information economics provide rigorous but restricted models, while traditional MIS studies suggest richer but less formal evaluation frameworks.
INTRODUCTION
the quantitative models and the realistic features of the MIS approach. Expanding on the concept of"information Two distinct but related issues in the domain of Informastructures," we develop a mathematical model of information Systems (IS) are system design and evaluation. What tion quality. The economic impacts of the information are the criteria on which alternative IS designs should be quality differential on the decisions utilizing the informaevaluated? How should the design parameters of an IS be tion are determined. Some properties of the information determined for a given context of use? These have quality model with implications for the system designer are remained two key research questions in the field for many derived. For example, we show how less detailedl informayears. A review of the relevant literature reveals two tion (which is cheaper to obtain) can lead to the same categories of research, based on information economics payoff for a class of decision problems. Counter-intuitive (Feltham 1968; Hilton 1981; Marschak 1963 Marschak , 1971 Mar- results, such as reduced payoffs with increased reporting schak and Radner 1972; Merkhofer 1977) and traditional frequency, and the conditions under which such problems MIS approaches such as the user satisfaction method are circumvented are obtained. We also provide an (Bailey and Pearson 1983; Epstein and King 1982; Nolan exposition of the design tradeoffs in the choice of informaand Seward 1974; Zmud 1978) . Information economics tion attribute values. Building on the impacts analysis, we provides a rigorous methodology for evaluating "informapropose a structured methodology for making design tion structures" in terms of a single criterion called improvements to existing systems. As a typical example 'fineness" (Marschak and Radner 1972) . The MIS literaof an operational level decision setting, we use a producture, although not mathematically as precise as information tion scheduling scenario as the reference context.
economics, suggests numerous information attributes or criteria that are not considered by the information econo-2. MOTIVATION AND PRIOR RESEARCH mics models. Clearly, there exists a gap between the rigor of information economics models and the richness of the Many IS evaluation techniques employ user satisfaction as MIS studies.
a surrogate measure of system effectiveness (Bailey and Pearson 1983; Ives, Olson and Baroudi 1983; Nolan and In this paper, we attempt to develop a unified and theoreti- Seward 1974; Powers and Dickson 1973) . While this cally sound basis for the evaluation and design of IS used approach measures the users' satisfaction with an IS, in operational level decision making. One of the goals of assessing the economic impacts of the lS is beyond the this research is to preserve both the analytical precision of scope of this method (Chismar, Kriebel and Melone 1985) .
In information economics, there has been rigorous research for this separation of the IS and decision characteristics is on the "value of information" using an information attribute shown in Figure 1 . called "fineness" (Marschak and Radner 1972) . The "fineness" criterion provides a formal mechanism for comparing "information structures." An "information
IS Desip
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Zmud 1978), an IS requires a multidimensional description, a feature not considered by the information economics models.
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Thus, it is evident that in spite of the existence of a body of literature, there is no generalized analytical model of (1979) , a consistent mathematical model of information quality is the first step in the evaluation of an IS. The crux of the evaluation problem lies in being able to measure the impact of information quality differential upon the payoff The signals generated by an IS have a set of attributes, to the decision maker (DM) utilizing the information. In which can be defined to be independent of any decision this paper, one of our goals is to reduce the large informacontext, and may therefore be called int,insic attributes.
tion attribute set found in the literature into a parsi- DM's payoffs in Section 5. We discuss "subsystem characdesigner to perform "dominance analysis" and thereby teristics," design parameters and their general functional identify a small number of "dominant" design variables.
relationships to signal attributes in Section 6. In Section Together with the characteristics of the decision context, the signal attributes determine the DM's payoff (or cost).
7, we provide a structured framework for choosing and Marschak and Radner (1972) This noise is expressed in the form of a likelihood function3
Resolution does not consider the "noise" present in the A(yls),the probability of receiving ycY, given that s€S has information. For example, the system that reports demand occurred (see Marschak and Radner 1972) . for individual items is considered to have higher resolution than the one reporting total demand, even though the latter may have less "noise" due to a natural averaging 4.1 Signal Timing and Reporting Frequency effect. For systems that are noiseless with respect to their state partitions, resolution and "fineness" (as used by Definition 1: Timing of a signal is the time at which the Marschak and Radner) have the same meaning:
signal is received by a DM. The reporting frequency, f, is the inverse of the time interval between the receipt of two successive signals by a DM.
Intrinsic Accuracy
While it may seem natural to associate reporting frequency Definition 4: For two systems differing only in terms of with repetitive decision making, in Section 6, we show how their likelihood functions, one is called intrinsically more reporting frequency can be important for a single.decision accurate than the other only if it is Blackwell sufficient for setting.
the other (Blackwell 1953; Hilton 1981) . Let system i have a likelihood function A(yi Is), i = 1,2. {s} = S is the set of distinct states for the two IS, and {Yi} = Yi is the signal set of system i. Since S and Y can be continuous or discrete 4.2 Monitoring Time (Period) sets, we use the integral sign to denote a generalized summation operator. Of course, any coarsening of S or Y Definition 2: Let an IS monitor the states of uncertainty is discrete. System 1 is intrinsically more accurate or sources 1, N at times tltN respectively. The set of these Blackwell sufficient for system 2 if a stochastic transformatimes is called the monitoring time of the IS. If the tion g(yi,yi) exists for which the following are satisfied: monitoring of an uncertainty source, i, takes place from ti to ti'' then the interval [ti, ti'l is used to denote the moni-
toring period for i. More intuitively, one system is more accurate than the Proof: Let {y} be the signal set corresponding to {s} in other if the latter can be realized from the former through the above definition. Using Definition 5, it is seen that a a stochastic transformation. The resolutions of the two stochastic transformation from {8} to {s}, given by systems must be the same for a comparison of intrinsic g(v/k'yi) = 1 for i=k, and 0 otherwise, satisfies conditions accuracy. For example, it is meaningless to compare the 2,3 and 4. accuracies of the blind men, each of whom is describing a different part of the elephant.
Discussion: This proposition shows that resolution can be the sole determinant of informativeness when the noise can be separated into disjoint components corresponding to the 4.5 Intrinsic Informativeness partition elements 4, i = 1,2,..,n. It provides a simple tool for comparing the informativeness of a subset of IS without
The definition of intrinsic informativeness is the same as doing the complex sufficiency calculations. that of intrinsic accuracy with the restriction on resolution removed. Note that uncertainty about the true states of the world is introduced by differences in accuracy and 4.7 Mapping between the Proposed and Existing resolution. Thus informativeness is the net effect of these Attribute Sets differences. The importance of informativeness is that it allows us to compare a set of IS (with comparable resoluHaving defined the signal attributes, we provide a mapping tions) without reference to a decision context. Thus if ISl between these attributes and those mentioned in the is more informative than IS2, then this relationship holds literature. This comparison highlights the confusion that true for any setting. Therefore, conditions under which exists m a section of the evaluation literature due to mixing one system is more informative than another are of special of intrinsic and extrinsic attributes and decision characterisinterest to us. ' tics. It is not possible to show a mathematical correspondence between the proposed attributes and those found in We show that differences in payoff occur due to a reducthe MRP-based IS is rarely perfect, the correct amount to tion of the DM's action set and/or uncertainty differences be produced is not known with certainty. Then an outregarding the true states of the world. The individual and come may be defined in terms of shortage or excess, joint impacts of intrinsic attributes upon the DM's payoffs depending on the state and the action chosen. We use a are illustrated below using a production scheduling decision simple cost function defined as z(a,s) = c+w+ + c-w;
context. The relevant uncertainty sources for this setting where w+ and w refer to the amount of excess and are demand, inventory, and shop floor condition (e.g., shortage, and c+ and c-to the corresponding unit cost. In machine loading and operator capacity), one or more of the following subsections, we use the terms "expected which may be important for a given setting. For simplicity, payoff' and "expected cost" interchangeably, with the we only consider demand uncertainty in this paper.
understanding that payoff in the current context is the Information on these uncertainty sources is generally negative of the expected cost. provided by an integrated Material Requirements Planning (MRP) based IS, which contains order processing/fore-5.1 Payoff Relevant Timing casting, inventory tracking and scheduling subsystems as components. The information received from the system IS signals often get delayed due to various reasons. For may be inaccurate, dated, too aggregate, delayed or example, long batching delays in a batch-oriented system irrelevant. We attempt to estimate the dollar impacts of are inevitable. In this section, we assess the impact of this these information attributes.
delay on the DM's cost.
Let a be the amount to be produced, an action chosen by Definition 6: Let the timings of two otherwise identical the DM. Let {s} denote the set of demand states. Since systems be tl and t2· If the DM's action set gets reduced in the interval [ti,td, such that an action clement which is optimal for some signal is lost, then the system with timing A(t) = i choice of numerical variables (e.g., the amount to produce or order in case of production or order schedules). In Before t = 4, A(t) does not become binding on the optimal many situations, the maximum value of the variable that amounts to produce, and the total minimum cost is $240. can be chosen decreases with time. For example, with a Thus earlier signal timing has no impact before t = 4. But given deadline, the maximum amount that can be produced for t=5 and 6, the expected cost increases to $245 and reduces with time. Similarly, for raw materials purchase, $340 respectively. In fact, it is not worth having the system a vendor may fill in orders on a FCFS basis. In that case.
' (even if for free) with signal timing t > 6, since the DM's orders placed later have a lower chance of getting filled in expected cost with a null system is $250. a given period. Let A(t) denote the maximum value of the decision variable that can be chosen at t. Also, let p(s) be the prior probability of s.
Payoff Relevant Accuracy
Proposition 2: With a stationary likelihood function. ' Definition 7: For two systems differing only in terms of earlier signal timing is preferred if their intrinsic accuracies, the value of payoff relevant (P-R) accuracy is the difference in expected payoffs (or costs)
given by expression (5) above, with Ak representing the at likelihood function of system k, k = 1,2 and with tl = t2-Proof: The difference in expected costs due to signal From the definition of intrinsic accuracy, it can be noted timings ti and ti can be shown to be that the payoff associated with a more accurate system is at least as high as that from a less accurate system. is always more accurate than the n-lth signal for n = The proposition implicitly indicates the possibility of a 1,2,..,n. However, if the maximum amount that can be noiseless system becoming inferior to a null system because produced, A(t), decreases over time, then the DM has to of the former's signal timing. A numerical example determine the optimal trade off between"good" actions and involving demand uncertainty follows. more accurate information. In particular, after receiving a signal, the DM has to choose whether it is optimal to Example: Let there be two demand states st = 10 and take an action immediately (denoted b a) or to wait for s2 = 20 with prior probabilities Pl = P2 = .5. Let the the next signal (denoted by B). If the P signal received at maximum amount that can be produced be time variant time (i-1)/f is y, let it be denoted by Yi· The DM's and be given by expected cost with a reporting frequency f is given by: With system 1, the DM is forced to take an action at t = 3, 6 E [c,Bl because the next signal is at t=6 with A(6) = 0. With Y2€Y system 2 (which has lower reporting frequency), the DM takes an action after receiving the second signal at t = 4, 42 may similarly be defined terms of (3• and this results in the lowest expected cost.
Proposition 3: For two otherwise identical systems 1 and 2 with reporting frequencies f, and fz respectively, fi > G 5.4 Payoff Relevant Monitoring Time does not guarantee lower expected cost with system 1. Very often a DM may need to know the value of a random Proof: By construction. Say fi and G are such that three variable (e.g., demand) at a particular time in order to signals (at t= 0, 1/fi, and 2/fi) from system 1 and two make a decision. For example, a DM using a simple signals (at t -0, 1/fj from system 2 are received by the forecasting routine needs to know the demand, inventory DM in the interval [O,T] . Since the accuracy increases with and shop floor conditions fur day t in order to make a time, signal 2 (from system 11) <a signal 2 (from system 2) production decision for day t + 1. In this case, t is the P-R <, signal 3 (from system 1), where <, stands for "less monitoring time. If the IS monitors the value of the accurate than." Let Yi· denote the ith signal from system i, random variables at any other point in time, then the i = 1,2. The first signaJ is denoted by yi for both systems. corresponding signal becomes less valuable, even though Say A(t) and the likelihood function are such that for all it may be perfect for the state of the world at the sampling Yi, 6 =B, and that instant. In general, the larger the difference between the P-R and actual monitoring times, the less the P-R relevance of the signal. In fact, when the difference is sufficiently high, the signal has no releyance to the state of the where p(st I soj) is the probability of state si occurring at t, given that state sj occurred at 0. The above condition implies that for all signals at 0, the DM waits for a later signal, and that the expected cost of taking an action at t = 1/4 is lower than those of taking Proposition 4: Let the functional form for the conditional actions at either 1/4 or 2/fi. probability p(s i I s°j) be given by Discussion: This proposition shows that an increase in reporting frequency can lead to an increase in expected For sufficiently large L the system approaches a null system. The rate of approach increases with a. lead to higher costs. A numerical example follows.
Proof: Let p(s') be the DM's prior probability density on The expected cost is given by {s} at t. Then as t -+ CO, p(sti I S j) -+ p(s i) Therefore, VaV € > 0 3t such that I p(s'i) -p(sti 1 soj) 1 < v i and j. Thus, for sufficiently small c, Le., for suffif rnY n f ciently large t, expression (7) are four P-R states. LEt an (xi,© = (100,100), (100,200), which is simply the expected cost for a null system. With (200, 100), (200, 200) . Let an order processing system larger values of a and for a given value of £, t becomes aggregate the information by reporting the total demand. smaller and the system approaches the null system faster.
The set of distinct states of this IS is given by {0} = {200, 300,400}. Let the prior density on the states be uniform.
Discussion: The functional form of the conditional Also, let the system be noiseless with respect to {8}. With probability is fairly general in that, as t increases, the the system, the expected cost is found to be $12,500 with information on the state at time 0 becomes progressively a'l = a'z = 150. This is the (opportunity) cost of lowerirrelevant in predicting the state at t. a is a measure of the than-adequate resolution, since the cost with a perfect rate at which the relevance of the signal is lost. For system and just-adequate resolution is $0 in this example. example, if the demand for a product is highly variable, then the corresponding a has a small value, indicating that the relevance of the information is lost quickly. This
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Cost of Higher-Than-Adequate Resolution proposition indicates that it is desirable that the actual monitoring time be close to the P-R time. Unfortunately, If e has higher resolution than Sp then some additional this may not always be feasible when long information effort is required upon the receipt of a signal in order to processing times and time variant action sets are involved. find the corresponding state in the P-R set Sp. In this case, In those cases, the monitoring may have to be done earlier the difference in cost is equal to the difference in the cost to avoid a loss of timeliness of the signal. This concept is of additional information processing. further discussed with an example in Section 7 on design modifications.
5.53
Action Relevant Resolution
Resolution Adequacy
For a wide variety of decision problems, the level of detail required is coarser than the corresponding P-R levels. For Definition 8: Let Sp denote the payoff-relevant set,of the example, consider a production system with two batch states for a DM. Let e be the set of states considered as sizes: 50 and 80 units. Say demand can take four values, distinct by an IS. The resolution of the IS is just adequate 30, 50, 80 and 100 units. The P-R partition of the demand if 8 = Sp, lower or higher than adequate accordingly as e space has four corresponding elements. However, note has lower or higher resolution than Sp. that the restricted optimal batch sizes are 50 units for any one of the states 30 and 50 and 80 units for the states 80 and 100 (assuming that the unit shortage cost is equal to 5.5.1
Cost of Lower-Than-Adequate Resolution the unit excess cost). Therefore, for this restricted action set, an IS that cannot distinguish between the states 30 and Let {8} = e have lower resolution than the P-R set {sp}. 50, and between 80 and 100 results in the same expected To determine the impacts of this resolution on the DM's cost as the one providing the P-R partition. We refer to payoff, we calculate the conditional probability A (sply) the less detailed IS as having the action-relevant (A-R) from A(@Iy), as resolution. This exposition is both interesting and important because it shows the possibility of getting the same ,(sply) = 0Ijp(sple),(ely) where payoff (or cost) with less detailed information for a class of decision problems. an IS. This IS is said to have action relevant resolution, if, for every s., only one action is optimal for every state that
Vsp£Sp 38 £8 such that p(G Isp) = 1.
may be contained in s,.
Proposition 5: Consider two IS, one with the A-R resoluNext we turn to the subsystem level of the IS and study the tion and the other with higher resolution. Let the systems design tradeoffs involved. be noiseless with respect to their own state partitions. The expected payoff (or cost) difference between the two IS is zero. The monitoring subsystem samples states of the world. For example, machine loading, operator capacity and maintenance routines may be monitored by the scheduling where a, is the optimal action corresponding to si. With subsystem of the MRP-based lS. The processing subsysthe A-R resolution, the expected cost is tem processes the monitoring data to create new information (e.g., the generation of parts list from customer order I min y information) and/or transforms the monitoring data into s,€S a€A 8, s,z(a,ei)p(Oil©p (si) aggregate reports. The parts requirement subsystem of the integrated MRP system is an example of the processing subsystem. It takes as input order and forecasting informaNote that p(#ilsi)p(si) is equal to p(s, 1 #i)p(Bi) and that tion and generates (through processing) raw material p(4 #i) = 1 for all Gicsi. Therefore, the two expected requirements. The exact sequence of subsystems is not the costs above are equal.
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same for every IS.
Discussion: Once the A-R level of detail is reached, more details are of no consequence to the decision context. Each subsystem may be considered as an individual system Therefore, any additional information is undesirable and described by certain attributes which are referred to because of the extra cost of more detailed information and as subsystem characteristics. For example, like the entire IS itself, the monitoring subsystem has accuracy, frequency, the processing load placed on the DM.
resolution, etc., as its attributes. These attributes are in turn determined by the design variables of the monitor.
Proposition 6: For systems that are noiseless with respect The general relationships between subsystem characteristo their own state partitions, A-R partition is "weakly tics and signal attributes are discussed in the balance of coarser" (i.c., never finer) than P-R partition.
this section.
Proof: Suppose not. Assuming that A-R partition is finer than the P-R partition, let { # } and {si} (in Proposition 5) The accuracy of each subsystem may be represented by a be the A-R and P-R partitions respectively. Without loss of generality, assume that the A-R element {si} consists of likelihood function relating the inputs and outputs of the two P-R elements, 81, and 81. Let a* and a** be the -subsystem. For a serial architecture, let {s,} = Si denote optimal actions for the states 01, and 82 respectively. From the input set of distinct states fur subsystem i,i = 1,2,...,n. Since the subsystems are relatively independent of one subsystem characteristics are found to be insensitive in another in terms of their subsystem characteristics, the terms of their effects upon the signal attributes, they problem of relating design variables to signal attributes are eliminated.
reduces to finding relationships between characteristics of each subsystem and its design variables. It is not possible 3. For each subsystem characteristic not eliminated in to have one universal model for relating design variables step 2, identify the corresponding design variables. As and subsystem characteristics in any IS. Rather, the in step 2, vary the design variables one at a time and models have to be chosen depending on the IS type. For eliminate the "insensitive" ones. Sometimes a change example, queueing models may be used to relate design in a design variable may necessitate a change in some variables such as the number of processors, batch size and other design variable(s) for technological reasons. For permissible queue length to the average waiting time in the example, an increase in the number of order procesorder processing subsystem of the MRP-based IS, while sors in an integrated production control system may regression may be appropriate in relating the number of have to be accompanied by an increase in the number error detection mechanisms to the frequency of missing of terminals for entering order information. In this information in the transmission subsystem. Economic case, the two design variables have to be considered production theory may also be useful in establishing in tandem in the analysis of the existing system. Also, linkages between design variables and subsystem charactera change in a design variable may affect several signal istics (see Kriebel and Raviv 1980) . Next, we discuss a attributes. For example, increasing the number of structured technique for setting the design variables of an error detection stages changes both accuracy and IS.
signal timing. At the end of this step, we have a small time t, Thus, the sampling time of the monitoring subsysset of "sensitive" design variables.
tem (which is a design variable for the monitor) is t. In this case, t is also the monitoring time, defined earlier as 4. Let V = {v} be the set of sensitive variables found in a signal attribute: Let p be the processing time necessary step 3. Let the signal attributes be denoted by SA = to generate an updated production schedule from the {sa}.
Let the DM's payoff function be P = monitoring data. Thus the revised production schedule is P(sat,saf,···)· The functional form of P has been available at time t + p. Say a DM uses this information to discussed in detail in Section 5. Since {v} is the set of decide on the amount of raw materials to order. Let the sensitive design variables, we can also write P as maximum amount that can be ordered be time variant and P(Vi,VD-4 through a mapping between {sa} and {v}.
be denoted by With the sensitive design variables and their impacts a < O.
on payoff identified, we turn next to the cost side of A(t), at the analysis, assuming that the payoff and cost are separable.
Let T be the P-R monitoring time. If the actual sampling time t 0 T, then t should be changed. However, note that 5. Generally, the cost of implementing and operating the changing t affects the signal timing in addition to the system with new design variable values is not known monitoring time itself. This is an example of a change in in advance. What is known with certainty is the cost a single design variable causing a change in multiple signal at the current operating point v( = (vi ,vk'".), where attributes. If t < T, then increasing t improves the payoff the subscript c refers to the current levels. Instead of on one hand due to increased signal "relevance" and on the assuming a known cost function for the entire design other hand possibly reduces the payoff due to the delayed space, we only assume that the partial cost derivatives signal timing (which affects the amount that can be The approximate cost at vn is given by C(vn) = C(\0 time, earlier signals are less accurate than later ones. Thus + f C(Vc) + 42C(Vc)· The new operating point can be on one hand, the expected cost decreases with later signals chosen by considering the region in the design space due to the increase in accuracy, while on the other, it can where the increase in payoff starts to saturate and the increase due to a possible reduction in the action set. The cost of the corresponding design change begins to rise relevant design issue is to synchronize the system to sharply.
generate a signal at a time such that the DM's cost is Review, Number 15,1973, pp. 147-156. That is, when the joint probability function is viewed Zmud, R. "An Empirical Investigation on the Dimensionas a function of B, given the observations, it is called ality of the Concept of Information." Decision Sciences, the likelihood function X0). Volume 9, Number 2, 1978, pp. 187-195. 4. Marschak and Radner assume that the information structures are noiseless with respect to their set of 10. ENDNOTES distinct states.
1. More precisely, less detailed than Marschak's (1963) 5. The subsystem characteristics are intrinsic properties payoff relevant description of states.
of the subsystems. For example, the accuracy of the processing subsystem is independent of the accuracy 2. The concept of payoff relevance was introduced by of the transmitting subsystem, although they may Marschak (1963) . Roughly speaking, it refers to the handle the same data set.
level of detail in the information that is sensitive to the DM's payoff. In this paper, we generalize the concept 6. For example, oIl but one subsystems may be noiseless to include all attributes of information.
and still the noisy subsystem may introduce significant noise in the signals.
3. For clarity, suppose we are sampling independent observationsyl'.., yN, from a population whose proba-7. For this simple case, the intermediate level of subsysbility functionf(y; B) involves one parameter, B. The tem characteristics is not necessary. joint probability function of the sample observations ("signals") is
